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Response

Unentrapped
William W. Bratton*
In Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism
for Corporate Governance,1 Professor Robert Ahdieh bids us to clean
up corporate federalism. We should stop describing the states as “racing” to make corporate law and stop evaluating the results of state
lawmaking as a binary choice of “top” or “bottom.” We should also
stop imposing determinative presumptions favoring state or federal
regulation, and instead grapple with institutional advantages and disadvantages of regulation at different levels of government as cases
arise. This is good advice. But I am hardly the person to gainsay it,
having been giving the same advice for a decade and a half.2
For me, then, the interest in Professor Ahdieh’s paper lies in the
theoretical review and restatement that leads up to these sensible con* Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law
Center; Research Associate, European Corporate Governance Institute.
1 Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for
Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255 (2009).
2 William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO
L.J. 401 (1994); William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary
and the Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447 (2000); William W. Bratton,
The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 181 (1992);
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995) [hereinafter Bratton & McCahery, Regulatory Competition]; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997).
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clusions. This discussion begins with a rumination on Ralph Winter’s
urtext on charter competition.3 Subsequent corporate federalists, says
Professor Ahdieh, have gotten Winter wrong. They see Winter as focused only on states competing for corporate charters, where Winter
in fact considered the charter market in a broader context of competitive constraints imposed by capital markets, product markets, and the
market for corporate control. Later readings of Winter, says Professor Ahdieh, wrongly collapse the broader market constraints into the
narrower charter market, employing the following logic: the charter
market makes the states sensitive to corporate managers; the capital,
product, and control markets force the managers to be sensitive to the
shareholder interest; therefore, the charter market makes the states
sensitive to the shareholder interest. This deductive conclusion, it is
argued, does not follow from the Winter description. State corporate
law, while competitively driven, responds only to the managers who
make the chartering decisions. State law accordingly cannot provide
an efficient solution to the problem of separated ownership and control. Such a solution, which Professor Ahdieh poses as a goal of efficient corporate governance (as opposed to efficient corporate law),
would depend in turn on capital market (as opposed to charter market) constraints. If capital markets are efficient, corporate governance
will be efficient; if capital markets are inefficient, so too will corporate
governance be inefficient even though the charter market may be
efficient.
It follows that the charter market does a less effective job than
that claimed by its federalist boosters. Even so, says Professor
Ahdieh, it holds out a pair of benefits. First, it provides managers
with the flexible rules they demand, rules that lower the cost of meeting shareholder demands. Second, because it holds out the possibility
of exit through reincorporation, it checks regulatory rent seeking and
thereby enhances the surplus created by the firm. It does not follow,
however, that federal intervention into corporate internal affairs is
necessarily a bad thing. Since the state system neither succeeds in
resolving the problem of separated ownership and control nor succeeds in resolving attendant matters of power allocation and distribution, federal intervention could be justified, provided that the
particulars of the case held out an efficiency improvement and the
political context holds out no risk of interest group rent seeking.
3 Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
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Professor Ahdieh’s thesis, thus restated, is robust. It is an accurate description that successfully negates the proposition that charter
competition leads to an efficient corporate governance system. The
negative, as Professor Ahdieh acknowledges, less concerns corporate
law itself than academic discussions thereon. The point is welltaken—something went wrong with this discourse, and I happily
would ramp up the criticism. Continued focus on the charter market
has prompted a generation of academics to engage in an intricate discussion of charter competition’s institutional context, variously showing how it does or does not mimic the incidents of a robust market for
widgets. All assume that a showing of similarity or dissimilarity has
momentous consequences, similarity implying efficiency and dissimilarity implying inefficiency. Like Professor Ahdieh, I find the whole
discussion somewhat beside the point, wondering why anyone would
expect a law market closely to resemble a product market in the first
place, particularly given that no one familiar with the economics of
regulatory competition would ever form such an expectation.
At the same time, I do not think that corporate law’s focus on
charter competition does any particular harm. Those who spend energy in highlighting the market’s flaws, while “trapped in the metaphor,” at least counterweigh the efficiency claims of the federalists.
Moreover, the granular description of the charter market that
emerges teaches us things about the properties of law as product, even
if it has limited normative implications for corporate law.4 So far as I
can see, the only people locked in by the corporate federalism perspective challenged in the article are its own exponents. Any negative
effects accordingly fall solely upon them, in the form of increasing irrelevance over time.
At the same time, academic discourse on corporate law, including
discourse on corporate federalism, is considerably more robust than a
reader of the article might conclude. Consider, first, federalism discussions. Even as these tend to focus on comparisons between the
charter market and conventional product markets, they are not
thereby limited. The literature yields a description of federal-state relations that is considerably more nuanced and instructive than an offthe-rack either/or based on first generation public choice theory.5 Nor
4 The initial contribution to this literature, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987), remains
to my mind the most compelling.
5 The leading exemplar is Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588
(2003), which situates Delaware in a national context of interest group conflict.
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are discussions of institutional design limited to narrow mandatory or
enabling federal-state comparisons. Some step outside of the box to
ask whether there is a correctable flaw in the charter market’s structure. These interventions start with the point that the charter market
tends to cater to management preferences and suggest that it accordingly makes sense to consider whether the market could be redesigned
so as to open a path to capital market inputs and thereby move corporate law in a more responsive direction. Professor Ahdieh rightly
chides charter market advocates for stonewalling at this point. A new
design would have to be federally mandated, and their federalism
forecloses such a possibility on a per se basis, even as these advocates
number among the critics of the antitakeover regulation that results
from the market’s responsiveness to management preferences. But
this theoretical stone wall has not prevented critics from confronting
and rejecting the Hobson’s choice posed. Joe McCahery and I made a
narrowly tailored proposal for shareholder access to amend corporate
charters to change the state of incorporation, positing that the charter
market thereby could extend its reach to the problem of separated
ownership and control.6 Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell followed
up with a broader proposal keyed to the reversal of state antitakeover
barriers.7
Federalism discussions in any event occupy a secondary place in
the wider corporate law scheme of things. Corporate law debates
center on three overlapping topics: (1) the appropriate scope of regulation and the degree of reliance accorded state authority or, alternatively, private ordering, in organizing firms and solving problems; (2)
the boundaries of the firm and the firm’s responsibility to outsiders;
and (3) the terms of the corporate agency relationship and the allocation of authority within the firm. Federalism intersects all three, but
in an instrumental posture.
The Cary-Winter debate concerned the first topic. Bill Cary, following Adolf Berle, favored strong fiduciary prohibitions over selfdealing by managers and control parties, and thus favored legal mandate over private ordering in the structure of corporate law.8 Because
competitively driven state law did not impose the mandates he advo-

Bratton & McCahery, Regulatory Competition, supra note 2.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001).
8 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 700–01 (1974).
6
7
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cated, he saw a race to the bottom.9 Winter reversed the race’s outcome because he thought that private ordering imported adequate
protection.10 Either way, the bottom-line question went to the level of
fiduciary constraint, with federalism positions following from conflicting views over the efficacy of mandates and private ordering.
The second topic pits progressive advocates of constituency rights
and corporate social responsibility against the corporate law status
quo. Here, the federalism intersect is largely beside the point. State
corporate law invites externalities by granting limited liability and limiting the class of beneficiaries of fiduciary duties to shareholders.
Given charter competition, no state has an incentive to change the
system. Any state that broke ranks would promptly lose all significant
incorporations, this being a matter on which management and shareholder interests are jointly aligned against change. The job of policing
externalities accordingly goes to external legal regimes, most of them
federal. Federalism questions certainly can arise respecting the level
of government most appropriate for a particular regime of external
regulation. But such a discussion would not implicate corporate law
federalism.
Today’s most salient corporate law debates devolve on the third
topic. The shareholder primacy camp wants the legal structure of the
firm to be revised more closely to resemble an actual (as opposed to
metaphorical) agency relationship, while defenders of management
discretion endorse the status quo. These debates intersect federalism
at crucial points. Since the status quo favors management, those who
propose revisions in the name of shareholder primacy tend to look to
federal securities law as the platform for intervention.11 Status quo
endorsement accordingly invites a reference over to charter competition and state-level responsiveness to business demands. But the federalism reference determines nothing. No serious advocate of
management discretion can rest the case on charter market constraints. Standing up to shareholder primacy requires an affirmative
defense based on economic and governance fundamentals.
Professor Ahdieh’s theoretical construct comes to bear on those
economic and governance fundamentals. Let us step outside of federalism to consider its implications for corporate law more generally.
Here, its contribution is descriptive. It identifies two levels of market
constraint—the charter market and broader capital, product, and con9
10
11

Id. at 666.
See Winter, supra note 3, at 255–56.
Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 7, is a leading example.
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trol markets—and observes that the combination of the two does not
solve the problem of separation of ownership and control. The observation underscores basic assumptions already held by many in the
field. Consider as an example the shareholder primacy camp’s recent
push to expand the set of binding shareholder votes.12 The reform
proponents, viewed from Professor Ahdieh’s perspective, seek to enhance the governance impact of the capital market constraint. Meanwhile, the controversy surrounding their initiatives goes not to
federalism, but to the characteristics of the capital market constraints
being invoked. Professor Ahdieh anticipates this back-and-forth
when he links the quality of corporate governance to capital market
efficiency. Assuming the link holds,13 the more efficient the capital
market, the better the quality of the market inputs in view, and the
stronger the case for reform; the less efficient the capital market, the
weaker the case for reform. Interestingly, those who join Professor
Ahdieh in questioning capital market efficiency will be more likely to
question the case for reform. Skepticism about capital market efficiency, followed to its logical conclusion, leads to the proposition that
the problem of separated ownership and control cannot be solved by
law reform that empowers shareholders, and so in the end bolsters the
management discretion position.
Further to this exploration of the article’s implications, consider
its normative objections to antitakeover regulation together with its
point that the quality of corporate governance follows from the quality of capital market constraints. The juxtaposition implies that antitakeover laws should be removed, with a consequent negative
implication for the federalism. But others who work from the same
base of assumptions articulate a different view. They argue that actors
in the capital markets responded to the imposition of antitakeover
barriers by working within the governance system to reorient management incentives toward the end of cooperation with the mergers and
acquisition market.14 If this is correct, state antitakeover barriers are
less important than corporate law observers usually assume because
12 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833 (2005).
13 I would question the assumption that the quality of corporate governance is linked to
capital market efficiency.
14 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity
in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (2001); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002).
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background market constraints are unexpectedly robust. This literature in effect takes Professor Ahdieh’s distinctions between corporate
law and corporate governance and between charter and broader market constraints to tell a story of successful market adjustment.
I will close with a caveat. While I readily join Professor Ahdieh in
putting charter competition in a secondary place in the overall scheme
of things, secondary does not mean irrelevant or trivial. State corporate law still matters, and charter competition matters with it, even if
markets, contracts, and the federal securities apparatus all matter
more. Once we stop jockeying over efficiency and inefficiency claims,
and step out of that context to appraise the state-level institution de
novo, the good outweighs the bad and competition plays a constructive role.
The good I see lies in Delaware’s evolution in the wake of destabilizing events like the federal incorporation threat of the 1970s and
the takeover wars of the 1980s. Its courts emerged as leading strategic
players, defusing the federal incorporation threat by taking fiduciary
law more seriously. In so doing, the Delaware courts experimented
with and then rejected the old Berlian trust paradigm,15 with its template of fairness review.16 Drawing on a self-regulatory model to substitute process scrutiny, they reinvented corporate fiduciary law,
making fiduciary review more compatible with both management’s
preferences and emerging notions of good governance. Delaware’s
judges at the same time emerged as leaders in ongoing discussions
about governance practices, strengthening the state’s tie to all of its
corporate constituents. Restating this point by reference to Professor
Ahdieh’s distinction between governance and law, Delaware’s judges
emerged as national leaders in corporate governance as well as in corporate law, providing a responsive, well-informed center of gravity in
both contexts. Given the claims jockeying that goes on all around
them, that amounts to no mean accomplishment.
Summing up, interventions in corporate law discussions can be
sorted into three types.17 One type assumes that markets work well
and that market constraints cure all ills. Any empirical evidence is
15 William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L.
737, 762–65 (2001).
16 The crucial case was Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), which abandoned a regime of mandatory judicial fairness scrutiny of cash-out mergers instituted by Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and accorded independent director determinations of
transactional fairness significant weight.
17 The typology draws on comments made by Professor Andrew Metrick at the Penn Law
Institute for Law and Economics Roundtable on December 12, 2008.
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interpreted to fit the market frame. A second type assumes that markets do not work and that self-serving and self-dealing conduct run
rampant. Any empirical evidence is interpreted to fit the market failure frame. The third type proceeds unattached to either body of prior
assumptions, proceeding flexibly toward reasonable observations.
Professor Ahdieh’s paper falls into the third category.

